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Abstract 
Whether or not seniority has a substantial effect on wages has been the subject of much 
controversy in the past decade, mainly in the U.S. Several economists have noted that 
unobserved heterogeneity across individuals and across job matches may produce 
inconsistent OLS-estimates of the effect of tenure on wages and turnover. Hence, labor 
economists have put forward two empirical strategies to deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity: Altonji and Shakotko (1987) use an instrumental variable for tenure, which 
is uncorrelated with the individual and job-specific component of the error term, but 
highly correlated with job tenure, whereas Topel’s (1991) basic idea is that within-job 
wage growth combines the returns to general and  job-specific experience. These two 
empirical strategies revealed different returns to seniority and experience for the U.S. 
labor market. Our goal is, on one hand, to use the different methodologies for the Swiss 
labor market and, on the other hand, to evaluate the sources of these differences. 
Thus, we replicate these methods with Swiss data (Swiss Labor Force Survey, SLFS). In 
a first step, we estimate returns to tenure and experience with the standard regression 
method, OLS. Subsequently, we apply the Topel and the Altonji/Shakotko estimator, and 
use different specifications for each. We find that (i) Topel’s approach delivers similar 
returns to tenure to OLS, i.e. about 8% within ten years of job seniority, while the 
Altonji/Shakotko method delivers substantially lower returns (4%). (ii) Returns to tenure 
are minor in Switzerland compared to the  U.S.                          3 
      
1  Introduction 
The idea that wages rise with job seniority is the foundation of the theory of specific human 
capital, as well as other commonly accepted theories of compensation. The extent to which 
tenure affects wages is important for several reasons: First and foremost, the wage-tenure 
profile gives fundamental insight to the structure of earnings over careers. Second, the wage-
tenure profile is a key determinant of the extent to which the earnings power of individuals is 
tied to specific jobs, and it is important for assessment of the losses suffered by “displaced” 
workers. Third, evidence that wages rise with job tenure has been used to explain the decline 
in quit rates with tenure, since the wage growth on the current job lowers the probability that 
the worker will locate a superior alternative. 
In our paper, we first discuss the problem of the empirical identification of returns to tenure. 
Returns to tenure and experience are expected to be biased when estimated with the 
traditional regression method, OLS (Ordinary Least Squares). The reason for these distortions 
lies in the likely correlations between experience, tenure and unobserved individual and job 
match specific effects. For example, since tenure is simply a function of past quit and layoff 
decisions, it will be positively correlated with individual characteristics and jobs which lead to 
lower quit rates and layoffs. These same characteristics are likely to be positively related to 
worker productivity, and, in competitive labor markets, to wages. For this reason, the 
traditional regression method (OLS) is likely to overestimate returns to tenure. 
To handle these biases, we concentrate on two methodological approaches, which have been 
widely discussed in the literature on specific human capital, namely the instrumental variables 
approach proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987, hereafter, AS) and the two-stage 
estimation procedure of Topel (1991). In their paper “Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority?”, 
AS propose to solve the correlation problem between tenure and the components of the error 
term by using an instrumental variable for tenure, which is uncorrelated with the individual 
and job-specific component of the error term, but highly correlated with job tenure. Topel’s 
basic idea is that within-job wage growth combines the returns to general and job-specific 
experience. Thus in a first stage he estimates wage growth within the same job, and in a 
second stage he makes a cross-sectional comparison of the wages of workers who started new 
jobs at different points in their careers. This gives an upper bound on the returns to experience                          4 
      
and thus allows separating these two wage growth effects while eliminating the biases that 
arise with OLS.  
However, the two approaches revealed diverse estimates for returns to tenure and experience 
in the United States. While AS named a wage effect of 6,8% within 10 years with the same 
employer in their preferred specification (which is only about one fifth of the corresponding 
OLS estimate!), Topel estimated a tenure effect of 28% within the same period of time. 
Altonji and Williams (1997, hereafter, AW) responded Topel’s article with the replication and 
re-estimation of Topel’s sample, and got substantially different returns. They argued that 
these differences arise due to mainly two reasons: First, the two methodologies differ in their 
responsiveness to measurement errors in tenure and second, they are sensitive to different 
methods that may be used to control for economy-wide trends in wages and inflation.  
The main aim of this paper is to compare the two alternative methodologies with a data set 
covering a time period during which only moderate economy wide wage growth occurred. 
With this property, remaining differences between the methodologies must have other causes 
than different detrending approaches. To show that remaining differences are not due to 
detrending we use different procedures to deal with economy wide trends in wages. First, we 
run our regressions with deflated wages - as suggested by Topel -, then use nominal wages 
with year dummies in accordance with AS, and finally run the regressions with nominal 
wages for a restricted time period where inflation was very close to zero.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the different empirical methodologies 
that have been suggested to measure returns to tenure. Section 3 describes the Swiss data set. 
The regression results are presented in section 4. Our main findings will be summarized in 
section 5.  
2  Methodological Background 
2.1  The Basic Wage Model 
Most studies investigating returns to tenure, including AS, Topel and AW, work with the 
basic wage model                          5 
      
(1)    ijt ijt ijt ijt T X t W e b b b + + + = 2 1 0  
where  ijt W denotes the log real wage of person i in job j in period t,  ijt X is total labor market 
experience, and  ijt T is tenure with the current employer. Parameters  1 b  and  2 b represent 
average returns to experience and tenure, respectively, and are the parameters of interest in 
this paper. The equation abstracts from a set of control variables, and from nonlinear terms in 
experience and tenure.  
The error term is decomposed as 
(2)    it ijt ij i ijt u + + + = h q m e , 
where  i m is a fixed individual specific error component,  ij q is a fixed job match specific error 
component,  ijt h is a time varying job match specific component, and  it u is the sum of 
measurement errors in the wage and a person specific error component that affects wages of 
all employees. AS, Topel and AW all ignore  it u because it is unlikely to be related to turnover 
behavior. Topel argues that  ijt h is unlikely to influence his analysis if it is a random walk and 
shows that the data are consistent with that. In our study, we mainly rely on these findings and 
concentrate on the individual and the job match specific error components.  
The key parameters of interest are  0 b ,  1 b  and  2 b , where  1 b is the partial effect of an 
additional year of experience on the wage, and  2 b is the partial effect of tenure. The 
parameter  0 b  is an economy wide trend in real wages. Many studies have used OLS to 
estimate these parameters, and they consistently find large returns to tenure. AS and Topel 
find that using OLS, the wage effect of tenure within ten years is about 30% and 35% 
respectively.  
However, using OLS to estimate these parameters is inappropriate because of the likely 
correlation between experience and tenure with the unobserved heterogeneity (individual and 
job match specific). Tenure and experience are likely to be correlated with the components of 
the error term because of several reasons:  
•  Tenure is likely to be a negative function of past layoff and quit decisions; the lower 
personal productivity is (the lower  i m ), the lower tends to be the time with the same                          6 
      
employer. This likely behavior will lead to an upward bias in estimating returns to tenure 
with OLS. 
•  Matching and search models (Burdett, 1978) imply that job shopping over a career will 
induce a positive correlation between experience and the unobserved job match 
component,  ij q  (experienced workers had more time to locate a good job).  
•  The correlation between tenure and  ij q  is ambiguous. On the one hand, workers will be 
less likely to quit high wage jobs, inducing that the correlation is positive. On the other 
hand, voluntary job changes will lead to low tenure values and therefore induce this 
relationship to be negative. Thus it is difficult to sign the effect of this correlation on the 
estimation results for returns to tenure.  
2.2  Altonji and Shakotko’s Instrumental Variables Estimator 
Altonji and Shakotko’s general wage model differs only slightly from the general wage 
model. The authors propose an instrumental variable to address the problems of individual 
and job match heterogeneity in the wage model. They specify the principal instrumental 
variable as the deviation of tenure from its mean for the sample observation on a given job 
match,  ijt ijt ijt T T T D - =
~
. This variable is uncorrelated by construction with both the individual 
specific error component of the wage equation and the permanent job match component. 
Abstracting from  ijt h , this variable is a valid instrument because it i s orthogonal to the job 
match specific and personal error components. AS refer to this estimator as the IV1 estimator. 
They get estimated returns to tenure, which are only about one fifth of what they would get 
with OLS. However, there are different possible sources of biases in the IV1 estimator: 
§  The likely positive correlation between experience and the job match specific error 
component  ij q  leads to a positive bias in 
1
1
IV b , and therefore to a negative bias in 
estimating returns to tenure (
1
2
IV b ).  
§  There are problems in measuring tenure. This might arise with OLS too, but the 
importance on the estimations is likely to be greater with AS, because the variance                          7 
      
of measurement error is larger in the instrument for tenure than in raw tenure
1.  
2.3  Topel’s Two-Stage Estimation Procedure 
Topel estimates returns to tenure with an alternative two-stage method. First, he 
estimates the wage growth for employees within the same job. With this strategy, he is 
able to  eliminate the biases that arise because of the individual and the job match 
specific error terms, because these terms are constant within the same job. In a second 
stage, he divides the effect of tenure and experience on wages. Topel subtracts the wage 
effect per year (using the coefficients from the first stage), such that he obtains the wage 
level at the beginning of a job. He uses this wage to identify the effect of experience on 
wages when a job begins.  
Real Wage Growth within the Same Job 
With the information on years within the same job, it is easy to see if the employees have 
changed their job. For the employees who stayed with the same employer over the years 
considered (stayers), one can compute within-job wage growth as follows:  
(3)   
1 - ijt ijt 2 1 1 - ijt ijt   -               W   -   W e e b b + + =    
With this method, the individual and the job match specific effect are eliminated. Since 
there’s always one year between two periods, one can say that DX = DT = 1. Therefore, wage 
growth ) W   -   (W 1 - ijt ijt  is the sum of returns to general  and job specific human capital 
accumulation, and thus reflects the sum of returns to tenure and experience. In a second step, 
Topel regresses wage growth on a constant, and gets a consistent estimator of wage growth 
(b1 + b2), if the estimator (ejjt - eijt-1) has an average value of zero. In addition, he includes 
higher order terms of tenure and experience and changes in dummy variables
2.  
                                                 
1 See appendix for a theoretical illustration. 
2 For example: if an employee gets married in one year, in this year the variable “dmarried” has a value of one, 
otherwise a value of zero.                          8 
      
Estimated Returns to Experience and Job Tenure 
The second stage of the Topel estimation separates the effects on wage g rowth of an 
additional year of job tenure (b1) and market experience (b2) respectively.  
With X = X0 + T, model (1) can be rewritten as: 
(4)    e b + + = TB X W 1 0   
where T = number of years within the same job (tenure) and  2 1 b b + = B . The first term 
on the right side of the equation represents the wage at the beginning of the job, whereas 
the second term describes the wage effect of accumulated general and firm-specific 
human capital within the same job.  
Equation (4) and the wage differentials from (3) lead us to: 
(5)    e b + = - 1 0 ˆ X B T W  
where  ) ( ˆ
2 1 b b + = B  is the consistent estimator from the first stage. Equation (5) describes the 
relationship between the estimated wage at the beginning of the job and the valuation of the 
employee’s previous experience. With subtraction from the first estimator, a lower bound of 
the wage effect of job tenure can be identified. 
Topel’s model relies on the assumption that both the job match specific and the individual 
error terms are constant over time and thus disappear when the equation is expressed in wage 
differentials. If experience is uncorrelated with job match or individual heterogeneity, the 
Topel estimator of returns to tenure and experience is unbiased.  
2.4  Differences and Problems of the Approaches 
AS, Topel and AW used substantially the same sample of U.S. data collected in the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). All calculations were made for the years between 1968 
and 1981. Only white male employees, aged between 18 and 65, were included. Table 1 gives 
a short overview of the results of Topel’s and AS’s estimations:                           9 
      
TABLE 1: ESTIMATED RETURNS TO TENURE WITHIN 10 YEARS FOR THE DIFFERENT 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES (LOG WAGE INCREASE)* 
 
OLS 
AS – Method 
(IV1) 
Topel’s Method 
(2 - step estimator) 
Altonji/Shakotko (1987)  0.263  0.066   
Topel (1991)  0.300    0.246 
*: The results displayed in this table apply to the preferred estimations of the authors.  
 
Let us first consider AS’s estimations. With the standard estimation method, they get a value 
for the wage effect within ten years with the same employer of 0.263. This means that an 
employee who is on the same job since this time period would take a wage loss of about 30% 
(e
0.263 - 1) of his income if his job ended exogenously, or if he decided to quit. When AS run 
the estimations with their alternative method, they display a wage growth effect from tenure 
of 6.8% (e
0.066 - 1) in 10 years on the same job, which is only about one fifth of what was 
computed with OLS. These results imply that a large part of the differences to OLS is caused 
by the strong correlation between wages and tenure (or that with the IV1 approach, one can 
eliminate the mentioned biases). The small returns to tenure with AS’s approach are 
accompanied by greater returns to general experience, namely 31.7% in the first ten years on 
the same job when computed with OLS or 48.2% with the IV1 procedure. This might be 
explained by the correlation between experience and tenure (a downward bias in tenure leads 
to an upward bias in experience). Thus, with the IV1 method, AS assign most of the wage 
growth to general experience, and only a modest part to tenure.  
The contrary is the case with Topel’s results. He estimates a wage effect of tenure of about 
28% for 10 years with the same employer, which is little below his OLS estimation result 
(35%). Altonji and Williams get substantially smaller returns to tenure, namely about 11%, 
when they replicate the sample and re-estimate Topel’s procedure.  
These different results raise the question which method yields the better estimations. 
AW stress that there are mainly two reasons, which might explain the divergent messages                          10 
      
and which will be discussed in the following subsections:
3  
•  different methods in controlling for economy wide time trends a nd changes in 
sample composition, 
•  measurement errors in tenure. 
Different Methods to Control for Economy Wide Trends in Wages and Changes in Sample 
Composition 
Topel argues that AS’s estimates for returns to tenure are substantially biased down from their 
treatment of the time trend as exogenous. He deflates his log wages with the so-called 
Murphy-Welch index, which nets out both real aggregate wage growth and changes in any 
aggregate price level, so that wage data in different points in time are expressed  in 
comparable units. From his point of view, there are two reasons for treating time as 
exogenous:  
§  Time is not statistically exogenous in panel data. With rising experience, job match 
quality ( ij q ) rises with time (persons with high market experience have had more time to 
locate a good job). In this situation, treating time as exogenous might lead to an 
understatement of seniority and to an overstatement of temporal wage growth.  
§  Time may be correlated with the mean of  i m : Household heads with better unobserved 
characteristics  i m  are likely to respond more often to the survey. Thus, sample attrition 
leads to an increase in average  i m  with time. 
To handle these problems, estimating returns to tenure with deflated wages could be a 
valuable solution. AW claim that the simple correlation between time and average experience 
is likely to be weak, and that this relationship is very weak in both their and Topel’s sample. 
                                                 
3 We concentrate on these two explanations. Further possible causes for unequal results are the functional form 
and the inconsistent timing of the tenure and earnings measures. Both Topel and AS showed that the functional 
form doesn’t influence the results substantially; this is in line with our findings. In the PSID data, most variables 
refer to the survey date, while the wage measure is annual earnings divided by annual hours in the previous 
calendar year. This possibility doesn’t apply to our data set, because all variables refer to the survey year.                           11 
      
However, the use of a time trend in the second step of the Topel estimator is likely to have an 
effect because Tijt is omitted from the wage equation and t is correlated with T ijt conditional 
on X0ijt.  
AW use different treatments of the time trend to check the influence on the estimators of 
returns to tenure; they conclude that the use of the Murphy-Welch wage index to detrend real 
wages (used by Topel) has little effect on the OLS estimates (they are persistent at 0.27 within 
10 years of job tenure). The same outcome  applies to the Topel estimator; here the 
coefficients of returns to tenure range between 0.22 (year dummies) and 0.25 (deflated 
wages). The effect of the use of different time trends is substantial to the IV1 approach; here 
AW observe a large upward bias in the estimator for returns to tenure when deflating the 
wage data (0.246) compared to the results which arise from treating time as exogenous using 
year dummies (0.093). So the net result of using deflated wage data is to move the Topel 
estimator closer to OLS and the IV1 estimator closer to both the Topel and OLS estimates.  
Measurement Errors in Tenure  
Topel specifies measurement errors in tenure in the AS sample as one of the leading factors to 
the differences in conclusions of the two articles. He argues that tenure is often measured in 
intervals of several years, such that year-to-year changes in recorded job tenure often don’t 
have the theoretical value of one. Topel reports that the estimated effect of tenure on wages 
rises substantially when he uses the IV1 estimator with his corrected tenure measure.  
AW state that AS were aware of the problems with measuring tenure. They found that 
eliminating the effects of bracketing of tenure values in the early years and unusual changes in 
tenure or smoothing the tenure variable increased their basic estimate from 0.067 to 0.084. 
They concluded that the measurement error is important, but not substantial, to their 
conclusions. Thus, the magnitude of the results seems to stay the same, in the sense that AS 
do not find very large wage effects from tenure. One could argue that if there’s a problem in 
measuring tenure, it is the same, no matter which estimation method is implemented. All the 
same, as we discussed before, the changes in the variance of the error term when different 
methods are used (see appendix) has a larger impact on AS’s results, because overall variance 
is greater than with the other approaches.                           12 
      
3  The Data 
We applied the different methodological proposals to the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS, 
Schweizerische Arbeitskräfteerhebung). For reasons of comparability to the U.S. studies by 
AS, Topel and AW, we included only male employees which are aged between 18 and 65. 
Our survey includes observations for the period of time between 1991 and 1998. One property 
of our sample which is different to the PSID sample is that our panel is a rotating panel, 
which means that every person is in the survey during five following years, while the sample 
used by AS, Topel and AW observes only people who were in the sample during the whole 
time from 1968 until 1981. This property of our sample is important for the considerations 
made before: The fact that our panel is rotating leads to the presumption that the problem of 
the correlation between time and experience or tenure is minor in our sample than in the PSID 
data set.  
One interesting aspect of the time period under consideration is the fact that the economy-
wide growth in wages was very low. This is due to the persistent recession that Switzerland 
suffered in the nineties of the last century. From 1991 to 1998 nominal wages for men in 
Switzerland only grew by a yearly average of 2.5%. This compares very favorably to the 8% 
wage growth from 1968 to 1983 in the U.S. labor market. Moreover, real wages of Swiss men 
only grew by an average of 0.4% in our sample. Therefore, the control of the economy-wide 
trend will only be of minor importance compared to the PSID sample used by AS and Topel. 
This is particularly the case for the years after 1995 with an average growth of nominal wages 
of 0.9% and real wages of 0.1% respectively. The development of real wages, nominal wages 
and consumer prices is shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2: CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION, NOMINAL AND REAL WAGE GROWTH FOR MEN IN 
SWITZERLAND, 1991-1998 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Consumer price inflation  5.9%  4.0%  3.3%  0.9%  1.8%  0.8%  0.5%  0.0% 
Nominal wage growth (men)  7.1%  4.9%  2.6%  1.5%  1.1%  1.2%  0.4%  0.8% 
Real wage growth (men)  1.9%  1.5%  -0.8%  0.4%  -0.4%  0.4%  0.0%  0.4% 
Source: Swiss Federal Office of Statistics (1999), Swiss Statistical Yearbook 2000, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Verlag, Zürich; own calculations. 
                          13 
      
In the empirical part, we will utilize the low wage growth property of our sample and run 
regressions for different detrending procedures. 
To get a short overview of our data set, Table 3 summarizes the properties of the most 
important variables in our sample:  
TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Full Data Set 
(N = 25’236) 
Stayers (1
st Stage Topel) 
(N = 12’252) 
  Mean  Standard Deviation  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Real Hourly Wage (CHF.)  43.15  27.18  43.54  20.57 
Yearly Real Wage  79’447  46’443  81’367  34’107 
Ln of Real Hourly Wage  3.67  0.40  3.69  0.38 
DReal Wage  0.020  0.307  0.014  0.205 
Tenure  10.16  9.54  11.75  9.50 
Experience  19.28  12.05  20.45  11.90 
Age  39.34  10.94  40.41  10.74 
 
The regressions were run with more than 25’000 observations for OLS and the second stage 
of Topel, 20’830 for the AS method, while in Topel's first stage (stayers) we used about 
12’000 observation.  
4  Estimation Results 
As discussed before, the use of different methods to deal with general trends in real wages 
was the most striking point to explain the differences in the estimators. To evaluate the 
importance of the use of different time trends for the results in Switzerland, we run our 
regressions for all the three estimation methods by using different detrending procedures.                          14 
      
First, we deflate wages with the consumer price index,  which is in line with Topel’s 
detrending approach. As a second specification, we follow AS and use year dummies to deal 
with economy wide wage development. Third, we restrict our sample to the low-inflation, 
low-wage-growth period from 1995 to 1998, and use nominal wages.  
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the three methodological approaches, with the 
described diverse real wage trend specifications:  




Nominal wages with 
year dummies  
(AS’s approach) 
Nominal wages, no 
time trend (’95-’98) 
OLS  0.075  0.075  0.076 
TOPEL   0.078  0.075  0.081 
AS  0.024  0.033  0.039 
 
When we compute returns to seniority with the standard estimation method (OLS) and real 
wages, we get an effect of ten years on the same job of 7.8% (e
0.075 –1). This means that on 
average, a typical Swiss worker would suffer a wage loss (because of the “loss” of his specific 
human capital which he accumulated during the period of the employment) of nearly percents 
if he would quit his job or get laid off.  
Because of the correlation between tenure and experience with the components of the error 
term, we would suppose that OLS leads to overestimated returns to tenure. So our alternative 
approaches are expected to lead to smaller returns.  
Our results with the Topel and AS estimation procedures are in accordance with the results 
that were obtained for the U.S., in the sense that with AS, returns to tenure are substantially 
smaller than with Topel. With AS, estimated returns to tenure within ten years of seniority are 
2.4%, while with Topel, our coefficients are three times as high.  
The second estimation strategy consists of detrending with nominal wages and year dummies, 
which is AS’s proposition for dealing with trends in wages. In column three, we can see that 
our coefficients do not change for OLS or Topel, and neither do change substantially for the 
AS estimation method.                           15 
      
Third, we run the estimations for the low-inflation period of 1995 to 1998. As a whole, we are 
able to observe that the results stay the same in the sense that the difference between the 
estimation results does not change with all the three detrending approaches, which validates 
our proposition that with our data set, we can rule out the problem of differing results due to 
different detrending conventions.  
After we have ruled out the other possibilities, the last remaining explaining factor for the 
substantially different results appears to be the problem of measuring errors in tenure. As we 
have discussed before, the different methods reveal different overall variance in tenure and 
thus lead to unequal estimations.  
Finally, we can observe that as the experience in the U.S. showed, Topel gets very close to the 
OLS estimations. In our sample, his returns are even at least as high as OLS, which seems to 
contradict our preliminary prediction that with Topel’s approach, we should get lower returns 
to tenure. There is an interesting parallel to our results in the literature concerned with the 
causal effects of education on wages. In the "returns to education" literature, the expectation 
is also that OLS leads to an upward bias in the effect of education on wages because 
individuals with higher unobserved productivity choose higher education. However, when 
Angrist and Krueger (1991) address ability bias using instruments for education, they find that 
the OLS estimator of returns to education is lower than the IV estimator for education. The 
interpretation put forward by Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) is that ability bias and attenuation 
bias have offsetting effects on the OLS estimator. However, it would make sense if further 
research addressed this phenomenon.  
We now turn to the question why returns to tenure and experience might differ between the  
U.S. and the Swiss labor market.  
Our results coincide with the experiences with U.S. labor market data, in the sense that:  
§  We find very little returns to tenure with the AS method (about 4% within 10 years of job 
seniority), while with Topel’s approach, the returns are in the same dimension as we get 
with OLS (about 8%). In the U.S., the respective values are 8% and 28%.  
§  The greater part of the yearly wage growth can be assigned to accumulated general 
human capital.                          16 
      
Although the direction of the estimated effects of job tenure and experience point into the 
same direction as in the observed U.S. studies, it seems that U.S. workers do get higher 
returns to tenure than Swiss workers. One possible explanation for the differences we found is 
an institutional one. In Switzerland, the apprenticeship is very common. After completing 
their compulsory schooling, nearly two-thirds of the country’s young people undertake such 
training with alternating periods of enterprise-base training and attendance at a vocational 
school. Since we only included employees (with completed education) in our sample, these 
people don’t appear. Due to the fact that tenure profiles are expected to be increasing the most 
in the first years, not including this group of workers leads to lower returns to tenure. As far 
as we are informed, the apprenticeship is not very usual in the U.S. labor market. This might 
be one of the reasons why we observe smaller returns to tenure in Switzerland.  
5  Conclusions 
The question of whether or not wages rise with job seniority is of practical as well as 
theoretical importance. From an employee/employer point of view, the wage-tenure profile 
gives valuable insight into the structure of earnings over careers. The wage-tenure profile 
determines to what degree the earnings power of an employee is linked to a specific job, and 
it is important for valuation of the losses suffered by “displaced” workers. 
The problem of measuring returns to tenure has been widely discussed in the last decade, 
especially in the U.S. There are two well-known approaches to deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity, which, in general, tell different stories about the extent to which wages rise 
with job tenure. The first was proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987), where an attempt 
was made to solve the correlation problem between tenure and the components of the error 
term. AS use an instrumental variable for tenure, which is uncorrelated with the individual 
and job-specific component of the error term, but highly correlated with job tenure. Topel’s 
(1991) basic idea is that within-job wage growth combines the returns to general and job-
specific experience. He estimates returns to tenure with a two-stage-procedure.  
These two approaches yielded disparate estimates for returns to tenure in the United States, 
which prompted the debate on which strategy yields better estimates. While AS named a 
wage effect of 6,8% within 10 years with the same employer in their preferred specification 
(which is only about one fifth of the corresponding OLS estimate!), Topel estimated a tenure                          17 
      
effect of 28% within the same period of time. Altonji and Williams (1997) specify several 
reasons for these diverging results. The most important ones are measurement errors in tenure 
and the difficulty to control for economy-wide trends in wages and inflation.  
We can rule out the latter argument because real wage changes and inflation were very low 
during the observation period. We use several approaches to detrend nominal wages to test 
this assumption. First, we run our regressions with deflated wages, then use nominal wages 
with year dummies, and finally run the regressions with nominal wages for a time period 
where inflation was very close to zero (1995 to 1998).  
Our results are in accordance with the experiences in the U.S. in the sense that with Topel’s 
method, we get substantially higher returns to tenure than with the AS approach. Topel’s 
estimation results imply that a Swiss employee gets a wage increase of about 8% after 10 
years with the same employer, compared to his  wage at the beginning of the job. The 
estimation results are substantially smaller when AS’s approach is used; they assign only 
between 2.4% and 4% (depending on the detrending convention) to this effect.  
Thus, our results suggest that with using the advantageous properties of our data set, we can 
rule out one of the two main reasons why the estimators of the two approaches differ, namely 
the different detrending procedures. The remaining differences in the results we found might 
therefore be ascribed to measuring problems in tenure, which will hopefully be addressed in 
further research in this area. 
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Appendix:  The effect of measurement error in tenure on 
estimated returns to tenure 
We discuss here the effects of random measurement error on estimated returns to tenure in 
OLS, Topel, and AS estimates. For simplicity, we assume that there is a sample of stayers (we 
drop the index j for the employer) and that we observe each individual for exactly N i=2 
periods (balanced panel).  
The baseline log wage model (abstracting from other effects and the constant) is the 
following: 
it it it T w e b + = 2
 
where w it is the log of hourly wages, Tit is tenure of individual  i at time t=1 or 2, b2 is the 
return to tenure, and eit is the unobserved component of wages. 
There is random measurement error in tenure, thus Tit is  
it it it T T h + = *  
where 
*
it T  is true tenure, and  it h  is mean zero i.i.d. measurement error with variance  2
h s . 



































This estimator is downward biased when compared to the estimator that uses true tenure  *
it T . 












This is the familiar “attenuation bias”. Attenuation bias increases in the variance of 
measurement error.                          20 
      
What is the effect of measurement error in wages on the Topel estimator? Information on 
tenure is used by the Topel estimator in the first stage (section 2). This stage uses information 
on wage changes from period t-1 to t. The Topel estimator is unaffected by measurement error 
in tenure, because increases in tenure from t-1 to t are measured without error (they are, by 
definition, 1).  
What is the effect of measurement error on the IV estimator proposed by AS? The instrument 
proposed by AS is the deviation of tenure from the mean of tenure for each individual 
2







What is the variance of measurement error in the instrument for tenure? Consider the extent of 
measurement error in the first observation per individual (the same calculation holds for the 
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Clearly, measurement error is more problematic in the AS framework than in OLS. 
Attenuation bias increases the longer individuals are observed on average, i.e. the higher Ni. 
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